博威---云架构决胜云计算

 找回密码
 注册

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

搜索
查看: 1358|回复: 3

一篇独立开发者的好文章:

[复制链接]
发表于 2023-2-13 11:08:14 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
]最近一篇独立开发者的好文章:[


mtlynch.io/solo-developer-year-5/[backcolor=rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.03)]
作者 5 年前辞了谷歌的工作,创办了TinyPilot 的公司。文章中他以财报的形式将所有的收入支出都列了出来,并且详细的描述了公司的运作和未来的计划以及运作中的经验教训。收入是:$812K


净利润只有:$6k(而且不给自己发工资)非常值得一读My Fifth Year as a Bootstrapped Founder
February 10, 2023  12-minute read
annual review • tinypilot

Five years ago, I quit my job as a developer at Google to create my own bootstrapped software company.
For the first few years, all of my businesses flopped. None of them earned more than a few hundred dollars per month in revenue, and they all had negative profits.
Halfway through my third year, I created a device called TinyPilot. It allows users to control their computers remotely without installing any software. The product quickly caught on, and it’s been my main focus ever since.
In 2022, TinyPilot generated $812k in revenue, a 76% increase from 2021.
In this post, I’ll share what I’ve learned about being a bootstrapped founder from my fifth year at it.
Previous updatesHighlights from the yearTinyPilot grew annual revenue to $812k





[td]
Income/Expense
2021
2022
Change
Sales
$459,529$807,459
+$347,930 (+76%)
Credit card rewards
$2,241$4,327
+$2,086 (+93%)
Raw materials
-$224,046-$333,656
+$109,610 (+49%)
Payroll
-$142,744-$206,187
+$63,443 (+44%)
Electrical engineering consulting
-$28,662-$124,643
+$95,981 (+335%)
Advertising
-$3,873-$51,764
+$47,891 (+1,237%)
Web design / branding
-$15,931-$30,215
+$14,284 (+90%)
Postage
-$24,227-$30,779
+$6,552 (+27%)
Cloud services
-$5,553-$7,865
+$2,312 (+42%)
Office space
-$4,400-$6,600
+$2,200 (+50%)
Equipment
-$2,083-$5,915
+$3,832 (+184%)
Everything else
-$4,902-$8,183
+$3,281 (+67%)
Net profit
$5,349
$5,979
+$630 (+12%)
While it sounds impressive to grow revenue by $350k, it’s a little less exciting that I’m only walking away with $6k in profit. I don’t pay myself a salary, so $6k is the full amount I earned from the business in 2022. Still, I’m excited about these numbers and what they mean for 2023.
One of the major cost increases was electrical engineering. Throughout 2021, TinyPilot’s electrical engineering vendor was struggling to keep up with TinyPilot’s growth. In late 2021, I switched to a new vendor that fits our needs better, but they cost three times as much.
The ongoing chip shortage forced us into frequent redesigns, which bloated costs in engineering hours and raw materials. We were often in a race to redesign a circuit board before we ran out of our existing version, so we repeatedly paid a premium to expedite the process.
We finally escaped the redesign treadmill in September. I’m hopeful that our fourth quarter results will reflect the coming year. Our profit was $28.6k for the quarter, so if we average $9.5k per month in 2023, I’ll be happy.
TinyPilot got a new website
When I launched TinyPilot in 2020, I told myself the website and logo were just placeholders. Then, things took off so quickly that I never had time to replace them.
In 2022, I finally hired a design agency to create a new logo and redesign the website.



[size=0.8em]Before and after the TinyPilot website redesign
I wrote previously about how frustrating and expensive it was working with the design agency, but I’m pleased with the result. My old website looked like a hobby project, and the new design looks like a real company. I suspect that at least a portion of my increased sales resulted from the new design.
The TinyPilot team grew from six people to seven
At the end of 2021, the TinyPilot team was:
  • Me, the sole founder
  • Three part-time software developers
  • Two part-time local staff who handle assembling devices and fulfilling orders
    • One of whom also handled customer service

By the end of 2022, we had added two support engineers and adjusted responsibilities, so the team is now:
  • Me, the sole founder
  • Two part-time software developers
  • Two part-time local staff who handle assembling devices and fulfilling orders
    • Both now work on customer service
  • Two part-time support engineers
Adding the support engineers felt like finding the missing piece of the puzzle. Before they joined, I was the only person handling technical support, and it occupied about 20% of my time. Now, I spend less than 5% of my time on support requests, and customers receive faster support.
The support engineers also do things I didn’t have time for, like investigating complex bugs, writing documentation, and improving our diagnostic tools.
Growing the team stretched my skills as a manager. In 2021, TinyPilot’s workflows were fairly simple. Almost everyone did their work as a single-person unit. The results either went directly to me or to a customer. When employees needed to coordinate with each other, it was always among teammates of the same role.
Integrating support engineers meant figuring out how different teams work together. How do support requests work when they require cooperation between fulfillment staff and support engineers? What’s the feedback loop between the support engineers and the dev team?
PicoShare became my fastest-growing project
One of my pet peeves in the last few years is how difficult it is to share a single file with cloud storage providers like Google Drive or Dropbox. They won’t give you a direct link to your file — just a link to their web interface, where they pressure your recipient to sign up for an account. If you upload a video to Google Drive, they make you wait 15+ minutes while they re-encode it, even if it was already optimized to play in the browser.
As an alternative to the existing cloud storage options, I made a minimalist file-sharing app called PicoShare. You just upload a file, and it gives you a direct link that you can share. Easy! No re-encoding, no prompts to sign up for anything.
Demo of PicoShare
There are a few open-source tools that offer similar functionality, but PicoShare is unique in not requiring a database server. That means you can run it in a single Docker container, whereas other solutions require more complicated orchestration.
PicoShare became the fastest-growing open-source project I ever published. It received 600 Github stars within two weeks of its release. As of this writing, PicoShare has over 100k installs.

Lessons learnedDon’t become anyone’s smallest client
I made many mistakes throughout the whole TinyPilot website redesign fiasco, but the core problem was that the design agency was a fundamental mismatch for TinyPilot.
The agency’s other clients had 5-20x TinyPilot’s budget. At first, I thought that was such a gift — this fancy agency with expensive clients was betting on a little company like mine.
The reality was that TinyPilot was the agency’s lowest priority. They managed the project poorly, which drove up costs, bloated scope, and stretched out timelines.
Now, when I work with new vendors, I ask them how my company compares to their other clients. If I’m an outlier in any important dimension like size, revenue, or industry, I look elsewhere.
Run at 50% capacity
Wouldn’t it be wonderful if your business’ capacity perfectly matched your customers’ needs? Your employees would fulfill every order and satisfy every support request while working exactly 40 hours per week. They’d never feel overworked nor underworked, and there’d be no idle time.
In practice, that would be a terrible system. Running at 100% utilization would mean you have no margin for error. Ordinary occurences like a bump in sales or an employee taking a vacation would immediately overwhelm you.
I aim for everyone at TinyPilot to run at around 50% capacity. That is, a balance of 50% reactive work and 50% proactive work. For some roles, the balance isn’t quite 50/50, but it’s a good rule of thumb.
The technical support team is the clearest example of a 50/50 split: they spend half of their time responding to support requests and the other half finding ways to save users from needing support. The proactive tasks include fixing bugs in the product, writing documentation, and improving our diagnostic tools.
Every TinyPilot team comprises two people. When one person is unavailable, the other can suspend their proactive work and handle time-sensitive tasks without feeling overwhelmed. If we get a rush of orders because a popular YouTube channel mentions us, we have spare capacity to absorb it.
[td]
Team
Reactive tasks
Proactive tasks
Founder
Team management
Vendor management
Reviewing work
Filling gaps in responsibilities
Marketing
Sales
Re-evaluating strategy
Hiring and training
Support engineers
Answering technical support questions
Writing documentation
Writing tutorials
Investigating difficult bugs
Software developers
Fixing urgent bugs
Releasing new features
Improving dev experience
Creating automated tests
Fixing non-urgent bugs
Fulfillment staff
Assembling devices
Fulfilling orders
Customer service
Creating support playbooks
Assisting in marketing
Ansible and git are not software distribution tools
When I started working on TinyPilot, I didn’t know how to distribute Linux software.
To publish the prototype of TinyPilot, I used the tools I knew: bash scripts, Ansible, and git. The bash script bootstrapped an Ansible environment and executed an Ansible playbook. Ansible installed dependencies, made necessary changes to the operating system, and cloned the TinyPilot git repository.
The installation process was okay, not great. It was slow but reliable and didn’t require the user to configure anything manually.
Two years later, TinyPilot’s update process was a mess. It still relied on the same shaky foundations from the prototype, except now there was a complex web of interdependencies. Ansible roles depended on Git repositories, which depended on other Ansible roles, which depended on parameters in a bunch of YAML files. Minor changes swallowed weeks of development time.
All this because I never bothered to learn standard Linux packaging tools.
This year, the TinyPilot team learned to use Debian packages. It was far less painful than I’d feared. I thought we’d have to deploy all sorts of package servers and key servers, but it turns out we didn’t need any of that. The process was relatively easy once we found the right guides.
Debian packages have accelerated our development. The tooling catches expensive mistakes earlier, and we can deploy pre-release versions to our test devices easily, whereas our previous installation system made that process prohibitively complex.
Grading last year’s goals
Last year, I set three high-level goals that I wanted to achieve during the year. Here’s how I did against those goals:
Grow TinyPilot to $1M in annual revenue
  • Result: Grew TinyPilot’s revenue by 76% to $812k
  • Grade: B
I always knew that $1M was an aggressive goal. We fell short, but I’m still impressed at how close we came.
Manage TinyPilot on 20 hours per week
  • Result: I spent more time managing TinyPilot in 2022 than in 2021.
  • Grade: D
I was hoping to automate and delegate away enough of my job to reduce my management time to 20 hours per week, but it didn’t happen. Between growing sales, spinning up the support engineering team, and putting out fires due to the chip shortage, my management time increased.
Ship TinyPilot Voyager 3
  • Result: We never even completed the design phase
  • Grade: F
TinyPilot has always used the Raspberry Pi 4B as the core hardware. There’s a wonderful ecosystem around the Pi 4B, but the hardware is relatively expensive and difficult to integrate with custom chips.
My plan for 2022 was to create a custom circuit board for the slimmer, less expensive Raspberry Pi Compute Module 4. That could cut our manufacturing costs by up to 60% and simplify our hardware design.
Instead, all of our hardware engineering time went to chasing down manufacturing issues and supply shortages, so we made no progress on a new product.
Goals for year sixManage TinyPilot on 20 hours per week
I failed miserably at reducing my hours last year, but it’s now my top priority. I’m hopeful about my chances this year. A lot of my 2022 work laid the groundwork to remove me from the critical path in 2023.
Earn $100k in profit
For TinyPilot’s first two and a half years, I focused on growth. I pay the same in hardware and software engineering costs whether I’m selling 20 devices per month or 2,000, so I needed to reach a certain scale to make the business viable.
For most of 2023, TinyPilot’s production will be constrained by supply. It was disappointing to find out I’d have no chance at growing sales, but the silver lining is that I can slow down and focus on profit rather than growth.
TinyPilot has always roughly broken even, but I think I can reach $100k in profit this year if I avoid further hardware redesigns. Without the hardware redesigns in 2022, I would have saved around $100k on engineering and $20k on materials. If I keep sales steady and run leaner on the hardware side, 2023 should be a profitable year.
Close the TinyPilot office
I’ve leased an office for TinyPilot since early 2021. We use it for assembling devices, fulfilling orders, and storing inventory.
Having our own local office has helped us adapt quickly to changes in our hardware and processes, but it’s a lot of extra overhead. This year, I hope to transition assembly to China, where all of our parts originate. I’m also in the process of moving our fulfillment to a third-party logistics warehouse.
Eliminating the TinyPilot office would spare us the work of maintaining a physical space, managing inventory, and tracking in-person shifts. Outsourcing manufacturing and fulfillment will also give the team more flexibility in time and location.
Do I still love it?
Every year, when I write these blog posts, I ask myself whether I still love what I’m doing.
2022 was a hard year — certainly my hardest since going off on my own. I wasn’t miserable, but I can’t say I loved it.
The global chip shortage meant we could never manufacture a batch of products the same way twice. There was always some missing component or manufacturing issue, so we were constantly racing to fix issues and adapt our processes before we ran out of stock. We got through it, and there were only a handful of days that I had to mark any product as sold out, but it was stressful.
That said, there were certainly many things to appreciate about the year. I had a relatively small amount of time for writing and software development, but I’m proud of what I produced. Expanding the TinyPilot organization and figuring out how teams work together grew my skills as a manager. It’s been gratifying to see the team grow in their roles and expand their skills as the company evolves.
I still prefer working for myself to having an employer. I still feel grateful for the freedom to have my own company. And I still want to do it forever.
2022 was a big year for my indie hardware business. We grew to $812k in revenue, got a new website, and added a new team. We also went through a lot of growing pains that taught me:

Never be anyone's smallest client
Keep 50% capacity freehttps://t.co/eGtD3pXy0b
— Michael Lynch (@deliberatecoder) February 10, 2023




 楼主| 发表于 2023-2-13 11:12:19 | 显示全部楼层
五年前,我辞去了谷歌开发人员的工作,创建了自己的自助软件公司。

在最初的几年里,我所有的生意都失败了。他们每个月的收入都没有超过几百美元,而且都是负利润。

第三年的中途,我创建了一个名为TinyPilot的设备。它允许用户在不安装任何软件的情况下远程控制计算机。这款产品很快就流行起来,从那以后它一直是我的主要关注点。

2022年,TinyPilot产生了81.2万美元的收入,比2021增长了76%。

在这篇文章中,我将分享我在创业五年中所学到的关于成为一名创业者的知识。

以前的更新

我作为独立开发人员的第一年

我作为独立开发人员的第二年

我作为独立开发人员的第三年

我作为创业者的第四年

今年的亮点TinyPilot年收入增长至812万美元







收入/支出

2021

2022

改变



销售额

$459,529$807,459

+$347,930 (+76%)



信用卡奖励

$2,241$4,327

+$2,086 (+93%)



原材料

-$224,046-$333,656

+$109,610 (+49%)



工资名单

-$142,744-$206,187

+$63,443 (+44%)



电气工程咨询

-$28,662-$124,643

+$95,981 (+335%)



广告

-$3,873-$51,764

+$47,891 (+1,237%)



Web设计/品牌

-$15,931-$30,215

+$14,284 (+90%)



邮费

-$24,227-$30,779

+$6,552 (+27%)



云服务

-$5,553-$7,865

+$2,312 (+42%)



办公空间

-$4,400-$6,600

+$2,200 (+50%)



设备

-$2,083-$5,915

+$3,832 (+184%)



其他一切

-$4,902-$8,183

+$3,281 (+67%)



净利润

$5,349

$5,979

+$630 (+12%)

虽然收入增长35万美元听起来令人印象深刻,但我只获得了6万美元的利润,这就不那么令人兴奋了。我不给自己发工资,所以我2022年从这家公司赚的全部是6000美元。尽管如此,我对这些数字以及它们对2023年的意义感到兴奋。

主要的成本增加之一是电气工程。整个2021,TinyPilot的电气工程供应商一直在努力跟上TinyPilot的增长。2021年底,我换了一家更符合我们需求的新供应商,但价格是原来的三倍。

持续的芯片短缺迫使我们频繁进行重新设计,从而导致工程工时和原材料成本过高。在我们用完现有版本之前,我们经常在重新设计电路板,因此我们反复支付了费用以加快流程。

我们终于在9月份躲过了重新设计的跑步机。我希望我们的第四季度业绩能够反映明年的情况。本季度我们的利润为28.6万美元,所以如果我们在2023年平均每月950万美元,我会很高兴。

TinyPilot有了一个新网站

当我在2020年推出TinyPilot时,我告诉自己网站和徽标只是占位符。然后,事情发展得太快了,以至于我从来没有时间更换它们。

2022年,我终于聘请了一家设计机构来创建新的徽标并重新设计网站。





[size=0.8em]TinyPilot网站重新设计前后

我之前曾写过与设计机构合作是多么令人沮丧和昂贵,但我对结果感到满意。我的旧网站看起来像一个爱好项目,而新设计看起来像一家真正的公司。我怀疑我的销量增长至少有一部分是因为新设计。

TinyPilot团队从6人发展到7人

2021年底,TinyPilot团队:

我,唯一的创始人

三名兼职软件开发人员

两名兼职本地员工,负责组装设备和完成订单

其中一位还负责客户服务



到2022年底,我们增加了两名支持工程师并调整了职责,因此团队现在:

我,唯一的创始人

两名兼职软件开发人员

两名兼职本地员工,负责组装设备和完成订单

两者现在都致力于客户服务

两名兼职支持工程师

加入支持工程师就像找到了拼图中缺失的一块。在他们加入之前,我是唯一一个处理技术支持的人,它占用了我大约20%的时间。现在,我花在支持请求上的时间不到5%,客户得到的支持更快。

支持工程师也会做我没有时间做的事情,比如调查复杂的bug、编写文档和改进我们的诊断工具。

随着团队的壮大,我作为一名经理的技能也得到了提升。2021,TinyPilot的工作流程相当简单。几乎每个人都作为一个单人单位完成工作。结果要么直接发给我,要么发给客户。当员工需要相互协调时,总是在同一角色的队友之间。

集成支持工程师意味着要弄清楚不同团队是如何协同工作的。当支持请求需要履行员工和支持工程师之间的合作时,支持请求如何工作?支持工程师和开发团队之间的反馈回路是什么?

PicoShare成为我增长最快的项目

过去几年,我最讨厌的一个问题是,与Google Drive或Dropbox等云存储提供商共享一个文件是多么困难。他们不会给你一个直接链接到你的文件,只是一个链接到他们的网络界面,在那里他们会迫使你的收件人注册一个帐户。如果你将视频上传到Google Drive,他们会让你在重新编码时等待15分钟以上,即使它已经优化到可以在浏览器中播放。

作为现有云存储选项的替代方案,我制作了一个名为PicoShare的极简文件共享应用程序。你只需上传一个文件,它就会给你一个可以分享的直接链接。容易的无需重新编码,无需提示注册任何内容。

PicoShare演示

有一些开源工具提供了类似的功能,但PicoShare在不需要数据库服务器方面是独一无二的。这意味着您可以在单个Docker容器中运行它,而其他解决方案需要更复杂的编排。

PicoShare成为我发表过的增长最快的开源项目。它在发布两周内就获得了600颗Github星。截至本文撰写之时,PicoShare的安装量已超过10万。



吸取的教训不要成为任何人的最小客户

在整个TinyPilot网站重新设计失败的过程中,我犯了很多错误,但核心问题是设计机构与TinyPilt根本不匹配。

该机构的其他客户的预算是TinyPilot的5-20倍。起初,我认为这是一个很好的礼物——这家拥有昂贵客户的高档经纪公司正在押注一家像我这样的小公司。

事实上,TinyPilot是该机构的最低优先级。他们管理项目不力,导致成本上升,范围扩大,时间延长。

现在,当我与新的供应商合作时,我会问他们我的公司与其他客户相比如何。如果我在规模、收入或行业等任何重要维度上都是局外人,我会寻找其他方面。

以50%容量运行

如果您的业务能力完全符合客户的需求,那岂不是太好了?您的员工将在每周工作40小时的同时完成每个订单并满足每个支持请求。他们永远不会感到工作过度或工作不足,也不会有空闲时间。

实际上,这将是一个可怕的系统。以100%的利用率运行将意味着您没有出错的余地。普通的事情,比如销售额的增长或者员工休假,都会让你不知所措。

我的目标是TinyPilot的每个人都能达到50%的产能。即,50%的被动工作和50%的主动工作的平衡。对于某些角色来说,这种平衡不是50/50,但这是一个很好的经验法则。

技术支持团队是50/50分割的最明显的例子:他们将一半的时间用于响应支持请求,另一半时间用于寻找方法来避免用户需要支持。主动任务包括修复产品中的错误、编写文档和改进诊断工具。

每个TinyPilot团队由两人组成。当一个人不在时,另一个人可以暂停主动工作,处理时间敏感的任务,而不会感到不知所措。如果我们因为一个受欢迎的YouTube频道提到我们而收到大量订单,我们就有多余的能力来消化。

团队

反应性任务

主动式任务



创始人

团队管理

供应商管理

审查工作

填补职责空白

营销

销售额

重新评估策略

招聘和培训



支持工程师

回答技术支持问题

编写文档

编写教程

调查疑难错误



软件开发人员

修复紧急错误

发布新功能

改善开发体验

创建自动测试

修复非紧急错误



履行工作人员

组装设备

履行订单

客户服务

创建支持行动手册

协助营销

Ansible和git不是软件分发工具

当我开始使用TinyPilot时,我不知道如何分发Linux软件。

为了发布TinyPilot的原型,我使用了我熟悉的工具:bash脚本、Ansible和git。bash脚本引导Ansible环境并执行Ansible剧本。Ansible安装了依赖项,对操作系统进行了必要的更改,并克隆了TinyPilot git存储库。

安装过程还可以,不是很好。它速度慢但可靠,不需要用户手动配置任何内容。

两年后,TinyPilot的更新过程一团糟。它仍然依赖于原型中同样不稳定的基础,只是现在有一个复杂的相互依赖的网络。Ansible角色依赖于Git存储库,后者依赖于其他Ansible的角色,后者依赖一堆YAML文件中的参数。微小的变化耗费了数周的开发时间。

所有这些都是因为我从未费心学习标准的Linux打包工具。

 楼主| 发表于 2023-2-13 11:13:42 | 显示全部楼层
今年,TinyPilot团队学会了使用Debian软件包。这远没有我担心的那么痛苦。我以为我们必须部署各种包服务器和关键服务器,但事实证明我们不需要这些。一旦我们找到了正确的指南,这个过程就相对容易了。

Debian包加速了我们的开发。该工具在早期发现了昂贵的错误,我们可以很容易地将预发布版本部署到测试设备上,而我们以前的安装系统使这个过程变得异常复杂。

为去年的目标打分

去年,我设定了三个我想在这一年实现的高层次目标。以下是我如何实现这些目标:

将TinyPilot的年收入增长至100万美元

结果:TinyPilot的收入增长了76%,达到812k美元

等级:B

我一直知道100万美元是一个积极的目标。我们没有成功,但我仍然对我们的成功印象深刻。

每周20小时管理TinyPilot

结果:我在2022年管理TinyPilot的时间比2021多。

等级:D

我希望能将我的工作自动化并委派足够多的时间,将我的管理时间减少到每周20小时,但没有实现。在不断增长的销售额、组建支持工程团队以及因芯片短缺而扑灭火灾之间,我的管理时间增加了。

船舶TinyPilot Voyager 3

结果:我们甚至没有完成设计阶段

等级:F

TinyPilot一直使用树莓派4B作为核心硬件。Pi 4B周围有一个奇妙的生态系统,但硬件相对昂贵,难以与定制芯片集成。

我2022年的计划是为更轻薄、更便宜的树莓派计算模块4创建定制电路板。这可以将我们的制造成本降低60%,并简化我们的硬件设计。

相反,我们所有的硬件工程时间都花在了解决制造问题和供应短缺上,因此我们在新产品上没有取得任何进展。

第六年目标每周20小时管理TinyPilot

去年我在减少工时方面惨败,但现在这是我的首要任务。我对今年的机会充满希望。我2022年的许多工作为我在2023年离开关键道路奠定了基础。

盈利10万美元

TinyPilot的前两年半,我专注于增长。无论我是每月销售20台设备还是2000台设备,我都会支付相同的硬件和软件工程成本,因此我需要达到一定的规模才能使业务可行。

在2023年的大部分时间里,TinyPilot的生产将受到供应的限制。令人失望的是,我发现我没有机会增加销售额,但一线希望是我可以放慢脚步,专注于利润而不是增长。

TinyPilot一直大致收支平衡,但我认为如果我避免进一步的硬件重新设计,今年我的利润可以达到10万美元。如果没有2022年的硬件重新设计,我将节省大约10万美元的工程费用和2万美元的材料费用。如果我保持销售稳定,并在硬件方面更加精简,2023年将是一个有利可图的年份。

关闭TinyPilot办公室

自2021年初以来,我为TinyPilot租赁了一间办公室。我们使用它来组装设备、完成订单和存储库存。

拥有自己的本地办公室有助于我们快速适应硬件和流程的变化,但这需要大量额外的开销。今年,我希望将组装转移到中国,我们所有的零部件都来自中国。我也正在将我们的订单转移到第三方物流仓库。

消除TinyPilot办公室将使我们省去维护物理空间、管理库存和跟踪人员轮班的工作。外包制造和履行也将使团队在时间和地点上有更大的灵活性。

我还爱它吗?

每年,当我写这些博客文章时,我都会问自己,我是否仍然热爱我正在做的事情。

2022年是艰难的一年——当然是我自独立以来最困难的一年。我并不痛苦,但我不能说我喜欢它。

全球芯片短缺意味着我们永远无法两次以同样的方式生产一批产品。总有一些缺失的部件或制造问题,所以我们在缺货之前一直在努力解决问题并调整流程。我们度过了难关,只有几天的时间,我必须将任何产品标记为售罄,但这很有压力。

也就是说,今年肯定有很多值得欣赏的东西。我有相对较少的时间用于写作和软件开发,但我为自己的成果感到骄傲。扩展TinyPilot组织,了解团队如何协同工作,提高了我作为经理的技能。随着公司的发展,我们很高兴看到团队在角色上不断成长,技能也不断提高。

我还是喜欢为自己工作而不是有雇主。我仍然对拥有自己公司的自由感到感激。我仍然想永远这样做。
 楼主| 发表于 2023-2-13 11:14:04 | 显示全部楼层
2022年对我的独立硬件业务来说是一个重要的一年。我们的收入增长到812万美元,建立了一个新的网站,并增加了一支新的团队。我们也经历了许多成长的痛苦,这些痛苦教会了我:



永远不要成为任何人最小的客户

保持50%容量freehttps://t.co/eGtD3pXy0b

-迈克尔·林奇(@deliberatecoder)2023年2月10日
您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 注册

本版积分规则

小黑屋|手机版|Archiver|boway Inc. ( 冀ICP备10011147号 )

GMT+8, 2024-11-22 06:35 , Processed in 0.102104 second(s), 17 queries .

Powered by Discuz! X3.4

Copyright © 2001-2021, Tencent Cloud.

快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表